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I. INTRODUCTION
Since it went into force in 1975, the Convention on International
Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Faunal ("CITES" or
"Convention"), has protected tens of thousands of species of endangered and threatened plants and animals from exploitation and extinction. In 1989, in response to the wholesale slaughter of African
elephants by poachers primarily for their tusks, the Convention
placed the elephant in its most protected category, Appendix I.
The effect of this Appendix I listing, which generally prohibits any
commercial exports or imports of living specimens or products of the
listed species, was dramatic. The price for ivory dropped throughout
the world, taking with it the lure of potential profits from sales of
elephant ivory. With the disappearance of a profit motive, poaching
of the elephant in Africa and Asia became a sporadic event in the
1990's. For nearly a decade, while the elephant remained cloaked in
CITES's highest level of protection, this "Ivory Ban," as it would
come to be known, was credited with a resurgence of elephant herds
throughout Africa.
However, in a very controversial move, the Convention voted in
1997 to allow Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Botswana to conduct a "one
time" sale of stockpiled ivory to Japan. Reports of increases in ivory
prices and elephant poaching following this sale led the Parties to
CITES to reinstitute the Ivory Ban in 2000 while implementing stud* Mario Del Baglivo is admitted to the bar of Maryland. Mr. Del
Baglivo practices in the State of Maryland as well. The author
wishes to thank Professor Steven Davison of the University of Baltimore School of Law for his support and guidance during the preparation of this article.
1. International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and
Flora, Mar.l, 1973, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243 [hereinafter
CITES or Convention].
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ies to try to establish any nexus linking the 1999 sale with increased
poaching. At the next Convention of the Parties to CITES (COP 12)
held in Santiago, Chile in November 2002, Zimbabwe, Namibia,
Botswana and South Africa sought authorization for annual quotas
of elephant ivory. Although the Convention denied the request for
quotas, Namibia, Botswana and South Africa received permission to
conduct another one-time sale of their stockpiled ivory. The ultimate
survival of the elephant may well rest upon the final outcome of this
debate over future authorized sales of ivory; it is feared the weave of
CITES's 1989 cloak of protection of the species will loosen with
each successive sale. However, CITES's own existence as an effective treaty also may be threatened by a decision to allow future sales
of ivory.
II. THE ELEPHANT
Elephants belong to the Order Proboscidea and Family Elephantidae. 2 There are two genera of the mammal, the African elephant
(Loxodonta africana) and the Asian (or Indian) elephant (Elaphas
maximus).3
A. The Asian Elephant
The Asian elephant (Elaphas maximus) is the smallest of all elephant species, with each animal weighing on average two to three
tons.4 One may live as long as seventy years without interference
from man. 5 Asian elephants currently inhabit India, Sri Lanka,
Myanmar (Burma), Indonesia, Thailand, Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos,
Malaysia, Nepal, Bangladesh and southern China. 6 There are three
subspecies of Asian elephant: E. m. maximus, E. m. indicus, and E.

2. See LAROUSSE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ANIMAL LIFE 579-80 (The
Hamlyn Publishing Group Ltd. 5th ed. 1971) [hereinafter LAROUSSE].
3. See id. at581.
4. See FRIENDS OF THE NATIONAL Zoo, Asian Elephant, at
http://www.fonz.org/animals/sppfactsheets/asian-elephant-fact.htm
(last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
5. See LAROUSSE, supra note 2, at 580.
6. See FRIENDS OF THE NATIONAL ZOO, supra note 4.
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B. The African Elephant
There are two species of the African elephant, the forest elephant
(Loxodonta africana cyclotis) and the savannah elephant (Loxodonta
0 The African savannah elephant is the largest of
africana africana).1
all land animals, weighing up to six tons.' 1The savannah elephant is
found in the grassy plains and bushlands of sub-Saharan Africa' 2,
while the smaller African forest elephant lives in the equatorial forests of central and western Africa.' 3 The average lifespan of an Afri-

7. See THE WILD ONES ANIMAL INDEX, Asian Elephants, at
http://www.thewildones.org/Animals/elephant.html (last visited Mar.
13, 2003).
8. See

IUCN

SPECIES

SURVIVAL

COMMISSION,

AFRICAN

ELEPHANT SPECIALIST GROUP: AFRICAN ELEPHANT DATABASE,

at

http://iucn.org/themes/ssc/sgs/afesg/aed/index.html (last visited Mar.
13, 2003).
9. See THE WILD ONES ANIMAL INDEX, supra note 7.
10. See Hillary Mayell, DNA Tests Show African Elephants are
Two Species, National Geographic News, Aug. 24, 2001, at
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2001/08/0824_twoelephants.
html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003). Recent DNA analysis revealing
that the forest and savannah African elephant are two separate species has repercussions beyond zoological taxonomy. Id. First, the
discovery means there are fewer members of each species and, therefore, both are more endangered than once thought. Id. Second, only
the species Loxodonta africana africana is protected by CITES;
there is some concern that under current treaty regulations, recognition of a second species could open a loophole that would allow
poachers to decimate the Loxodonta africana cyclotis population. Id.
11. See LAROUSSE, supra note 2, at 581.
12. See WORLD WILDLIFE FEDERATION, African Elephant, at
http://www.panda.org/resources/publications/species/cites/fs-afeleph
.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
13. See id.
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can elephant, without interference from man, is fifty years.14 The
IUCN Species Survival Commission's African Elephant Specialist
Group' 5 estimated that, in 1998, there were between 301,773 and
487,345 African elephants alive on the continent. 6
C. Threats From Man
Elephants are social animals that live in matriarchal groups.1 7 Elephants communicate within the group and with other groups by using low frequency calls that carry for six miles.' 8 Fighting between
elephants is rare. 19 Humans are the only natural enemy of ele20
phants.

1. Loss of Habitat
Habitat destruction by humans poses the greatest risk to the survival of all elephant species in Africa 2 1 and Asia. 22 Man competes
for food and habitat with the elephant.23 In Africa, the two species of
elephant face different threats from habitat destruction. 24 While for14. See LAROUSSE, supra note 2, at 580.
15. See

IUCN

SPECIES
SURVIVAL
COMMISSION,
AFRICAN
ELEPHANT SPECIALIST GROUP: AFRICAN ELEPHANT DATABASE 1998, at

http://www.iucn.org/themes/ssc/sgs/afesg/aed/aed98.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
16. See World Wildlife Federation, African Elephant, at
http://www.panda.org/resources/publications/species/threatened/dow
nloads/AFRICAN4.DOC (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
17. See Michael J. Glennon, Has International Law Failed the
Elephant? 84 Am. J. Int'l L. 1 (Jan., 1990.) The African Savannah
elephant travels in groups of about ten members. Id.
18. Glennon reports that on the same day culling of elephants began in a national park in Zimbabwe, elephants located some ninety
miles away began to flee to an opposite corner of the reserve. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id. at 2.
21. See WORLD WILDLIFE FEDERATION, supra note 12.
22. See WILD ONES ANIMAL INDEX, supra note 7.
23. Scott Hitch, Losing the Elephant Wars: CITES and the "Ivory
Ban, " 27 Ga. J. Int'l & Comp. L. 167, 171 (1998).
24. See Mayell, supra note 10.
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est elephants are threatened primarily by commercial logging, it is
agricultural expansion that poses the greatest loss of habitat threat to
African elephants of the savanna.25 Logging and agricultural development have also significantly decreased the habitat of the Asian
elephant. 26 Since approximately 20% of the human population of the
settlement is a particularly serious
earth lives in its range, human
27
elephant.
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to
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2. The Bushmeat Crisis
For centuries Africans have hunted wildlife of all varieties as food
for local consumption. 28 In particular, meat from primates has served
as a staple of native diets in Africa. 29 However, elephants, antelopes,
and many other species have been hunted in Africa for their meat.3°
Once considered a sustainable use of wildlife, 3 1 the hunting of African fauna for bushmeat has reached levels that threaten to push some
endangered species to the brink of extinction. 32 The plentiful supply
of firearms throughout war-ravaged areas of Africa has fueled the
25. Id.
26. See IUCN Species Survival Commission, supra note 8.
27. See id.
28. See CNN, Rein in Bushmeat Trade, Experts Say (Apr. 6,
1999), at http://www.cnn.com/NATURE/9904/06/bushmeat.enn/index.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
29. See id.
30. CNN, Bushmeat: Logging's Deadly Second Harvest (Apr. 23,
1999), at http://www.cnn.com/NATURE/9904/23[bushmeat.enn/index.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003). The bushmeat trade flourishes
in areas adjacent to logging roads. Id. See also Simon Robinson, The
Next Threat: Out of the Jungle and into the Pot (Apr. 17, 2000), at
http://www.time.com/time/europe/magazine/2000/0417/bushmeat
html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003). These roads now penetrate forests
that were once too dense for easy access by bushmeat hunters. Id.
31. See Robinson, supra note 30. CITES defines bushmeat as
meat for human consumption derived from wild animals. For many
Africans living in isolated regions, bushmeat has often served as the
only source of animal protein in their diets. Until recently, however,
the numbers of wild animals taken for their meat did not pose a risk
to the survival of any particular species. Id.
32. See id.
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bushmeat crisis. 33 To make matters worse, meat taken from endangered and 34non-endangered species has been exported to Europe for
retail sale.

3. Poaching and The Ivory Trade
In Africa, the elephant is considered a pest because it is a competitor of humans for habitat and food. 35 However, Africans also recognize this "pest" as a potential source of great wealth for their impoverished nations. For one thing, elephants bring tourists and tourists
bring much needed foreign currency to struggling African nations.
But the greatest potential for turning elephants into revenue in Africa
comes from the animal's ability to produce ivory tusks. 36 At the
height of the pre-1990's popularity of ivory (for use in Asian medicines and aphrodisiacs, as well as for carved crafts and trinkets), as
37
much as 1,000 tons of ivory were exported annually from Africa.
Only 10% of that ivory came from "legal" sources, that is, from legal
hunting and government culling campaigns. 38 The remainder of this
ivory was the product of poaching.
Without doubt, poaching was the greatest immediate threat to the
survival of the African elephant as a species during the decade end33. See id; see also, Gary Strieker, Wildlife Casualties Add to

Death Toll in Congo (July 24, 2000), at http://www.cnn.com/2000/
NATURE/07/24/congo.wildlife/index.html (last visited Mar. 13,
2003). During the conflict in the Democratic Republic of Congo in
2000, an estimated force of 35,000 heavily armed soldiers used
bushmeat from gorillas, chimpanzees, elephants, and rare okapis as
their major food source. Wildlife official reported that ten elephants
were killed in one week during this time. Wildlife rangers also reported that in the Kahuzi-Biega National Park, bushmeat poachers
had nearly wiped out all the gorillas, elephants, and antelopes that
were thriving in the Park immediately before the incursion of the
troops into the remote area. Id.
34. See Robinson, supra note 30. In 2000, Germany and Belgium
authorities seized bushmeat shipments destined for restaurants popular among African migrants. Id.
35. See Hitch, supra note 23, at 171.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Glennon, supra note 17, at 1.
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ing in 1989. 39 Between 1979 and 1989, the elephant population in
Africa fell from 1,300,000 to 609,000. 40 Just prior to the imposition
of the CITES Ivory Ban in 1989, the death toll for African elephants
reached 200 animals per day. 4l In fact, the African savannah elephant became extinct in many parts of its range during the 1980's.42
During these years of unbridled poaching of African elephants, the
price for raw or "unworked" ivory skyrocketed. The 1960's price of
five U.S. dollars 43 per pound of ivory rose to 50 dollars in the 1970's
and increased to 125 dollars by 1987. 44 Some estimates set the zenith
in prices for ivory during this period at 300 dollars per pound.45 At
these prices, the tusks from an older bull African elephant could garner 5,000 dollars in the black market for ivory.46
III.

THE CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL TRADE IN ENDANGERED

SPECIES OF FLORA AND FAUNA

A. History
In response to the alarming global decline in both the population
and varieties of endangered species of wild animals and plants, the
World Conservation Union 47 ("IUCN") drafted the Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species of Flora and Fauna during the late 1960's and early 1970's.48
39. See id. at 3. The CITES Ivory Ban went into effect in 1989.
40. Hitch, supra note 23, at 172.
41. See id.
42. See Joseph R. Berger, The African Elephant, Human Economies and International Law: Bridging a Great Rift for East and
Southern Africa, 13 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 417, 421 (2001).
43. Hereinafter "dollars."
44. Berger, supra note 42, at 423. These prices reflect the major
consumer markets for raw ivory in Japan, Hong Kong and parts of
Europe.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 424. This would be the middleman's take. The poachers
who killed the elephant would receive about one-tenth of this
amount. Id.
47. Hereinafter IUCN.
48. Hitch, supra note 23, at 175.
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CITES was originally developed to meet the urgent challenge of
halting the loss of the unique endangered flora and fauna of the
Earth. The Preamble to the Convention states simply-but eloquently,
the intentions of the Parties and their call to action:
* Recognizing that wild fauna and flora in their many
beautiful and varied forms are an irreplaceable part of
the natural systems of the earth which must be protected
for this and the generations to come;
* Conscious of the ever-growing value of wild fauna
and flora from aesthetic, scientific, cultural, recreational
and economic points of view;
L Recognizing that peoples and States are and should be
the best protectors of their own wild fauna and flora;
D Recognizing, in addition, that international cooperation is essential for the protection of certain species
of wild fauna and flora against over-exploitation through
international trade;
* Convinced of49 the urgency of taking appropriate measures to this end
CITES was initially signed by twenty-one nations in 197350 and
ratified baY ten nations. 5 ' The Convention entered into force on July
1, 1975.

Currently, there are 158 Parties to CITES.53

Unlike the Convention on Biodiversity, 54 CITES does not regulate
55
the efforts of Parties to avoid habitat destruction or modification.
49. CITES, Preamble, 27 U.S.T. 1087, 993 U.N.T.S. 243.
50. Note, The CITES Fort Lauderdale Criteria: The Uses and
Limits of Science in International Conservation Decisionmaking,
114 Harv. L. Rev. 1769, 1773 (2000); see also CITES, What is
CITES?, at http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/what.shtml (last visited
Mar. 13, 2003). Work on drafting CITES began as the result of a
resolution passed at a 1963 IUCN meeting. Id.
51. Hitch, supra note 23, at 175.
52. Id. See also What is CITES? supra note 50.
53. See CITES, The Syrian Arab Republic joins CITES, at
http://www.cites.org/eng/news/party/syria.shtml (last visited May
11, 2003). On July 29, 2003, CITES will enter into force for the Syrian Arab Republic making it the 162nd Party to the Convention. Id.
54. Convention on Biodiversity, June 5, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 818.
55. See DAVID HUNTER ET AL., INTERNATIONAL ENVIRONMENTAL
LAW AND POLICY 937 (2002). The Convention on Biodiversity re-
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Nor does CITES directly or indirectly control the takings of any species of plant or animal. CITES was drafted to provide a regulatory
framework to limit world-wide trade in endangered and threatened
species and to control trade in other species on a sustainable basis.56
Regulation of trade in endangered species under CITES is accomplished through a system of permits for the importation and exportation of livinf specimens of these species and any products derived
plants and animals
from them. Currently, some 34,000 species of
58
Convention.
the
by
extent
some
are protected to
Parties join CITES voluntarily.5 9 However, Parties to the Convention are legally bound to implement the treaty; each member nation
must adopt domestic legislation that implements the rules of
CITES. 6 °

B. Regulatory Structure
The trade permit system which serves as the regulatory backbone
of CITES is tied to the placement of a particular species on one of
three Appendices that list all plants and animals protected by
CITES. Placement of a species on a CITES Appendix is, in turn,
62
dependent on the overall viability of the species in its native range.
CITES requires Parties to the Convention to meet every two
years. 6 3 At each biennial meeting, the Parties review the three Appendices to determine whether to add, delete, or move a species from
64 Any amendments to Appendix I or II must
another.
listing to by
one
majority of Parties in attendance and
a two-thirds
be approved

quires Parties to develop and implement strategies for conserving
biodiversity and to integrate these programs into economic planning.
Id.
56. Hitch, supra note 23, at 176.
57. Id.
58. HUNTER ET AL., supra note 55, at 1005.
59. See id.
60. See id.
61. See Hitch, supra note 23, at 176.
62. See id.
63. See Glennon, supra note 17, at 12.
64. Id.
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voting at the meeting. 65 Changes to 66the Appendices enter into force
ninety days after the meeting closes.
Appendix I contains those species of flora and fauna for which the
limitations on trade are the strictest. 67 Trade in Appendix I species
requires an import permit from the recipient nation, as well as an
export permit from the country of origin (trade in Appendix H or III
species requires only a permit from the exporting nation.) 68 Under
CITES, a species can only be placed on Appendix I if it is "threatened with extinction." 69 Trade between nations in these species may
only take place under circumstances deemed exceptional 7° and only
for non-commercial purposes. 7 1 Any potential threat to the viability
of an Appendix I species of plant or animal from trade activity requires Parties to CITES to halt such trade. 72 It is widely accepted
that an Appendix I listing serves as a defacto ban on all international
trade in living specimens or products of a species.73
Plant and animal species listed in Appendix II of CITES are those
deemed to be less in danger of extinction than Appendix I species.74
Commercial trade in Appendix II species is allowed by CITES and
regulated under the permit system. Parties must closely monitor the
effect of trade on these plants and animal species to assess the impact on their viability within the exporting country. 76 Any trade in
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. See Note, supra note 50, at 1773.
68. See How CITES Works, at http://www.cites.org/eng/disc/how.
shtml (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
69. See Note, supra note 50, at 1773 (quoting CITES art. II, para.
1, 27 U.S.T. at 1092, 993 U.N.T.S. at 245).
70. See Note, supra note 50, at 1774.
71. See id; see also CITES, supra note 68. Additionally, in the
case of a live animal or plant, it must be prepared and shipped to
minimize any risk of injury, damage to health or cruel treatment. Id.
Also, "the proposed recipient must be suitably equipped to house
and care for it." Id.
72. See Note, supra note 50, at 1774.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See CITES, supra note 69.
76. See Note, supra note 50, at 1774; see generally How CITES
Works, supra note 68. Under CITES, the goal of controlling trade in
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species listed in Appendix II requires accompanying permits stating
that the scientific authority of the exporting nation has determined
that trade will not be detrimental to the survival of the species.77
Appendix III contains species that are protected by at least one
member nation. 78 It is the country of origin that primarily controls
export of an Appendix III species, i.e. the member nation itself decides what level of trade of an Appendix III species or its products is
appropriate, if any. 79 The CITES permit system 80 operates to regulate international trade in Appendix III species by mandating that,
upon request by a fellow Party to the Convention, other Parties must
monitor importation of the species 8' to assist the requesting
export82
ing nation in controlling illegal trade exports of the species.
CITES does not provide a direct mechanism for global enforcement of Convention rules. 8 3 Instead, CITES primarily relies on each
Party to implement the Convention by adopting national lefislation
regulating trade in endangered species with other nations. 8 Within
Appendix II species is to halt utilization incompatible with their survival. Id.
77. See Note, supra note 50, at 1774; see also How CITES Works,
supra note 68. Again, in the case of a live Appendix II animal or
plant, it must be prepared and shipped to minimize any risk of injury,
damage to health or cruel treatment. Id.
78. See CITES, supra note 69.
79. See Note, supra note 50, at 1774.
80. See CITES, supra note 69.
81. See The CITES Appendices I, H and III, at
www.cites.org/eng/append/index.shtml (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
82. See id.; see also How CITES Works, supra note 68.
83. See Ruth A. Braun, Lions, Tigers and Bears: [Oh My] How to
Stop EndangeredSpecies Crime, 11 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J. 545, 557
(2000).
84. See id.; see also Glennon, supra note 17, at 13-4. CITES allows any Party to adopt stricter domestic controls on trade in endangered and threatened species than those required by the Convention,
for example the U. S. Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 15311541 (1982). Glennon, supra note 17, at 13-4. Under the Act, importation into the United States of any endangered species or their products is prohibited. Id. In addition to controls required by participation in CITES, the U. S. Fish and Wildlife Service is authorized to
impose additional restrictions on ivory when necessary. Id. The De-
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their own borders, Parties are required to penalize illegal traffickers
and confiscate live specimens and/or products of a species protected
under CITES. 85 The Convention, therefore, relies on the internal police powers of each member nation to impose criminal and/or monetary sanctions on persons convicted of illegally exporting or importing living specimens
of a protected endangered species or products
86
species.
of the
To implement CITES outside their borders, Parties must refrain
from trade in endangered species or their products with non-member
nations unless the latter uses trade permits comparable to those used
by member nations. 87 However, there is no provision in the Convention requiring Parties to sanction offending nations. 88 Rather, CITES
merely recommends that Parties penalize countries that engage in
trade that violates the Convention. 90
partment of the Interior stated in 1988 that, under the Endangered
Species Act, the Secretary was permitted to ban the importation of
ivory. Id. At the time, a complete importation ban of this type far
surpassed the CITES restrictions on ivory. Id. at 13. The African
elephant was moved from Appendix II to Appendix I one year later
effectively banning the global ivory trade. Id. at 17.
85. See Glennon, supra note 17, at 13.
86. See Braun, supra note 83, at 558.
87. See Glennon, supra note 17, at 12.
88. See Braun, supra note 83, at 558.
89. See CITES, United Arab Emirates: Recommendation to Suspend Trade, at http://www.cites.org/eng/notifs/2001/079.shtml (last
visited Mar. 13, 2003). For example, on November 20, 2001, the
Secretariat to CITES conveyed its recommendation that "all Parties
should refuse any import of specimens of CITES-listed species from
and any export or re-export of such specimens to the United Arab
Emirates until further notice, because it was evident that the Convention was not adequately implemented there." Id; see also CITES,
List of Contracting Parties at http://www.cites.org/eng/parties/
alphabet.shtml (last visited Mar. 13, 2003). CITES went into force in
the United Arab Emirates on September 5, 1990 (making it the 10 4 th
Party to CITES); see also CITES, Partial Withdrawal of Recommendation To Suspend Trade With The United Arab Emirates at
http://www.cites.org/eng/news/sundry/uae-suspension-partialwith
drawal.shtml (last visited Mar. 13, 2003). Because "the United Arab
Emirates has made great progress towards putting into place the leg-
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Critics who charge that CITES is ineffective in stopping illegal
trade in endangered and threatened species (and their products) often
point out that "regulation"
of the trade too often falls far short of
"prohibiting" the trade. 9 1
One controversial feature of CITES makes total prohibition of
trade in an endangered or threatened species virtually impossible.
Any member State may make a unilateral statement, or reservation,
that it will not be bound by the provisions of the Convention regulating trade in a particular species or product of a species. 92 Once a
Party "takes" a reservation on a particular species, it is not considered a Party to the Convention for that species 93 and may engage in
exports and imports of the species.
islative and operational measures necessary to ensure correct implementation of CITES," the Secretariat announced the decision to lift
the trade sanctions in a three phase process was made in March
2002.
90. See Braun, supra note 83, at 557; see also Amy E. Vulpio,
From the Forests of Asia to the Pharmacies of New York City:
Searching for A Safe Haven for Rhinos and Tigers, 11 GEO. INT'L
ENVTL. L. REV. 463, 479-80 (1999). To date, the United States is the
only country that has used trade sanctions against another nation to
protect endangered species. Id. In 1994, in response to a burgeoning
"illegal trade in rhinoceros and tiger products traceable to China and
Taiwan, the CITES Standing Committee" suggested that Parties to
the Convention consider strict measures, including trade sanctions,
against those two nations to persuade them to halt the illegal importation of the products. Id. at 479. After giving both nations notice
that trade measures might be imposed against them if they did not
improve enforcement of existing importation bans, the Clinton Administration imposed trade sanctions on Taiwan effective April 11,
1994. Id. at 479-80. China managed to avoid trade sanctions against
it by taking specific and effective actions to control the illegal trade.
Id. at 480. These actions were verified by the United States and acknowledged by the Standing Committee of CITES in March 1994.
Id.
91. See Braun, supra note 83, at 558.
92. CITES, Reservations, at http://www.cites.org/eng/append/reserveindex.shtml (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
93. LAWRENCE E. SUSSKIND, ENVIRONMENTAL DIPLOMACY;
NEGOTIATING MORE EFFECTIVE GLOBAL AGREEMENTS 102 (1994).
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Against this backdrop of heavy poaching and the near extinction of
the African elephant, the Parties to CITES kept the elephant listed on
Appendix II from 1977 to 1990. 94 During that time, CITES' protection of the elephant was limited to a complex registration system that
is now recognized as a failure. 95 About half of the African Parties to
the Convention ignored the CITES rules governing ivory trading
and, in those nations that observed the restrictions, ivory traders used
various methods to escape prosecution for illegally exporting
ivory.9 6

As the toll of African elephants killed each day for their ivory rose
into the hundreds in the mid-1980s, some nations acted on their own
to ban the importation of any ivory past their borders. 97 Japan, the
nation that imported more ivory than any other, banned ivory imports in 1985. Recognizing that CITES was failing to protect the
African elephant from impending extinction within the decade, the
United States Congress passed the African Elephant Conservation
Act 9 9 in 1988.00 The Act halted importation of all raw and worked
ivory into the U.S.' 0 The European Union passed similar legislation
in 1989.102 These unilateral actions by the United States and Euro-

94. See Sam B. Edwards, III, Legal Trade in African Elephant
Ivory: Buy Ivory to Save the Elephant? 7 ANIMAL L. 119, 125
(2001).
95. Id.; see also, Berger, supra note 42, at 423. As much as 75%
of the legal trade quota allowed under the registration system in its
first year (1986) was thought to be from illegal poaching. Id.
96. Edwards, supra note 94, at 125.
97. See id. at 125.
98. See id. at 121. The Japanese imported 32% of the global supply of ivory available between 1979 and 1988. Id. Obviously, the
Japanese ban (1985) was far from effective in halting black market
activity. Id.
99. 16 U.S.C. § 4201 (2000).
100. See Edwards, supra note 94, at 126.
101. See id.

102. See id.; see also Commission Regulation 2496/89, 1989 O.J.
(L240).
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pean nations were credited
with significantly decreasing the world03
1
ivory.
for
wide demand
At the same time that nations were unilaterally acting to halt the
ivory trade to slow the massive slaughter of African elephants, some
Parties to CITES, including several African nations, were agitating
to have the elephant designated an endangered species by moving it
from Appendix II to Appendix I. 1 4 Kenya and Tanzania, which
sought a complete ban on ivory trade, were the most vocal of the
African nations supporting this amendment.' ° 5 Southern African nations, including South Africa, Zimbabwe, and Botswana, argued
against changing the status of the elephant to endangered by moving
it to Appendix 1.106 However, at the 1990 Seventh Conference of the
Parties (COP 7), the voting members moved the African elephant to
Appendix I, thereby banning
all elephant products (including ivory)
07
trade.'
international
from
Most observers credit the CITES Ivory Ban with virtually ending
the poaching crisis throughout Africa.' 8 Moving the African elephant from Appendix II to Appendix I had a dramatic effect on
worldwide ivory prices and, in turn, the intensity of poaching of elephants in Africa. 09 For example, in Kenya, where as many as 3,500
elephants were killed by poachers each year during the crisis, the
numbers of elephants poached per year dropped to 50 by 1993.110

103. See Edwards, supra note 94, at 126. When compared to the
Japanese ban announced in 1985, the U.S. and European Union actions of 1988-89 were highly successful. Id.
104. See id. A move from Appendix II to Appendix I would impose
a de facto ban on all international trade in ivory.
105. See Berger, supra note 42, at 424-27. Kenya and Tanzania,
and other East African nations, had suffered the greatest losses in
elephant population due to poaching during the previous two decades. Id.
106. See Edwards, supra note 94, at 126. Some Persian Gulf states,
Hong Kong, and Japan opposed the Ivory Ban. Id. It is interesting to
note that Japan, which had announced an importation ban on ivory in
1985, now opposed an international trade ban. Id.
107. See id.

108. See Berger, supra note 42, at 427-28.
109. See id.

110. See Edwards, supra note 94, at 126.
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Widely accepted as the only means to saving the African elephant
from extinction, the 1989 Ivory Ban worked well at achieving this
end at two important levels. As already stated, the Ban dramatically
reduced the poaching of elephants for their tusks because the profit
motive at the critical supplier (poacher) end of the ivory market was
greatly diminished. But the Ban, and the global publicity surrounding it, also succeeded in raising the consciousness of buyers of ivory.
Some ten years after imposition of the Ivory Ban, jewelers reported
that the international demand for ivory was "dead.""' A Johannesburg, South Africa, jewelry wholesaler described the dramatic effect
of the Ban on the perception of ivory as a commodity among the
public - even in Africa - when he stated "People are too embarrassed or ashamed to ask about ivory."" 2 The 1989 Ivory Ban, there-

fore, was highly successful both in halting the mass slaughter of elephants for their tusks and in publicizing the issue to the point that
many found it unconscionable to purchase any ivory,3 even that
stockpiled from elephants that died from natural causes.
With pressure from intense poaching eliminated, the elephant
population of Africa stabilized and underwent a recovery throughout
the continent unmatched by any species in the history of CITES." 4
In Kenya alone, the elephant population grew by 13,300 in the decade following the imposition of the ivory ban in 1989.1 15
V. THE 1999 IVORY SALE

A. CITES Approval and Conditions to the Sale
As a result of moving the African elephant to Appendix I and the
de facto Ivory Ban implemented by this action, the population of
African elephants rose dramatically, particularly in southern Af111. See Kate Dunn, Elephants, Rejoice! Ivory Ban May Bend, But
Nobody's Buying, Dec. 15, 1998, at http://csmweb2.emcweb.com/
durable/i 9 9 8 / 12 / 15 /p 152.htm.
112. Id. (explaining why, contrary to the accepted laws of supply
and demand, the price of ivory fell rather than rise in the face of a
dwindling supply following imposition of the Ban.)
113. Id.
114. See Edwards, supra note 94, at 126.
115. See Berger, supra note 42, at 427.
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rica.1" 6 The increasing size of the elephant herds put pressure on humans who shared the same range with the elephant and who com117
peted with the species for habitat, i.e. food, water, and shelter.
With African elephants protected from slaughter by poachers solely
for their tusks, elephant range states spent increasingly large sums to
manage elephant herds. 118 At the same time, ivory from "legal"
sources, including the natural death and culling of elephants, was
being added to the supply of stockpiled ivory that African nations
already had on hand from the interdiction of poachers." 9 With the
Ivory Ban in place, these nations now had to pay to protect the
stockpiled ivory from theft and to keep it stored in humidified conditions. 12 As one commentator noted, the stockpiles12of "legal" ivory
went from "financial assets to liabilities overnight."' '
As the elephant population grew throughout its range, southern African nations managing elephants became increasingly resentful of
the CITES ban on the ivory trade. 122 Several sought some relief to
the absolute ban on the sale of ivory from elephants.12 3 In particular,
Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Botswana (countries in which the elephant
population staged a significant population growth) mounted a campaign to move the African elephant back to Appendix II so that they
could once again use the species as a source of much needed foreign
currency. 124 These southern African nations were aided in this effort
116. See Edwards, supra note 94, at 127.
117. Id. at 126. The elephant is considered a pest by many Africans
who point to its reputation for destroying crops and injuring people
and livestock. Id.
118. Id. at 127. The cost to protect and preserve endangered wildlife in Africa was estimated to be $305 million dollars in 1995. In
that same year, habitat preservation costs were estimated to be $200
per square kilometer. Id.
119. See id. African nations had become dependent on the sales of
legally obtained ivory and the $100,000 to $200,000 per ton price
traders paid for it while the African elephant was on Appendix II. Id.
120. See id. Ivory must be stored under controlled conditions because it gradually dries out. The required level of security and environmental controls make ivory very expensive to store. Id.
121. Edwards, supra note 94, at 127.
122. See id.
123. See id.
124. See id.
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by a handful of non-African Parties to CITES who also sought a resumption of the ivory trade at some level under the close supervision
of the Convention. 125The southern African nations gained additional
support for their proposal to move the elephant back to Appendix II
when the CITES Panel of Experts, appointed at the last Conference
of the Parties, reported that the African elephant population in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Botswana
no longer met the biological criteria
126
listing.
I
Appendix
an
for
Although the proposal to move the elephant from Appendix I to
Appendix II in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Botswana met with strong
opposition from many nations outside the continent, as well as several eastern and central African Parties, the measure passed by the
required two-thirds vote at the 1997 COP 10 in Harare, Zimbabwe. 127 Additionally, the Parties voted to allow these three nations
to conduct a one-time sale of stockpiled ivory' 28 to Japan to be concluded eighteen months after COP 10 ended. 129 One important requirement for the sale to occur was that all proceeds were to be earmarked for elephant conservation in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Botswana. 30 Once the sale to Japan was completed in 1999, no further
125. See id.
126. See id.; see also Berger, supra note 42, at 428 n.63.
127. See Edwards, supra note 94, at 127; see also, Berger, supra
note 42, at 428 and n.63. When the Parties moved the African elephant to Appendix I at the 1989 COP, they also established a special
procedure for future downlisting of any species within a particular
nation. That procedure included the use of a Panel of Experts to
study the proposed downlisting using scientific criteria to assess the
impact on the species. Although future downlisting would depend
on the recommendation of the Panel of Experts, the Parties reserved
unto themselves the power to control conditions of sales and quotas
of a downlisted species. Id.
128. See Berger, supra note 42, at 428.
129. Id. The eighteen month waiting period was required by the
Parties to verify the adequacy of conservation efforts in the three
nations and to assess their regulatory controls on ivory stockpiles. Id.
130. See id. at 429. Other conditions of the sale included that (1)
Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Botswana each withdraw their reservations
to an Appendix I listing of the elephant; (2) stronger legal enforcement, reporting, and monitoring of anti-poaching measures within
each nation; and (3) development of a mechanism that would halt the
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sales were allowed without the3 approval of a two-thirds majority of
the Parties to the Convention.'
After the eighteen month waiting period had elapsed, the CITES
Standing Committee announced in February 1999 that Zimbabwe,
Namibia, Botswana, and Japant 32 had met the preconditions imposed
on the sale and authorized that it proceed. 33 The sale to Japan took
place in April 1999 and raised $5,000,000.134
B. The Post-Sale Period
At the April 2000 Convention of the Parties (COP 10) in Nairobi,
the CITES Standing Committee reported that Zimbabwe, Namibia,
and Botswana had not manipulated "legal" sources of ivory to increase government stockpiles prior to the sale and that the sale had
35
not served as an opportunity for the laundering of poached ivory.'
The Committee also stated there was no significant increase in the
poaching of elephants in the three nations attributed to the one-time
sale to Japan 36and that the sale was a complete success in that it
had not prompted any significant increase in illegal elephant deaths
137
on the African continent.
However, critics of the 1999 sale paint a very different picture of
the effects of the sale on poaching and, ultimately, the threat it posed
to the survival of the African elephant as a species. The International
Fund for Animal Welfare (IFAW) reported that elephant poaching in
trade in stockpiled ivory by the three nations if renewed poaching or
noncompliance with conditions for the sale occurred. Berger, supra
note 42, at 429.
131. See id. at 428-29.
132. See id. at 430. The Standing Committee also determined that
Japan had put into place effective controls on its domestic ivory
trade. Id.
133. See id. at 430.
134. Id.
135. See id. at431.
136. Id. The Standing Committee refused to link the authorized
sale with several large illegal shipments of tusks intercepted in
Kenya after the sale. The Committee also stated that reports of increased poaching in India and Chad following the sale were unfounded. Id.
137. See id. at 431-32.
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Zimbabwe, Zambia, the Democratic Republic of Congo, the Central
African Republic, Ghana and other African countries began to escalate as early as 1997, when the decision to allow the sale was announced. 138 IFAW reported a 50% increase in elephant poaching in
Zimbabwe alone in 1997 and 1998.139 Numerous studies conducted
by other international nongovernmental (environmental) organizations 14 documented increased elephant poaching and
ivory smug4
gling across the African continent after the 1999 sale.'1
According to the International Fund for Animal Welfare, poachers
believed the ban had been lifted throughout Africa and were building
142
up stockpiles of poached ivory in anticipation of renewed trade.
These reports were attacked as unreliable by organizations representing the sustainable-use position of several African nations. 143 Vendors and craftsmen in West and Central Africa, upon hearing of the
ivory sales in southern Africa, prepared for what they believed
would4 be the beginning of the end for the Ivory Ban throughout Af14
rica.
After the approval of the sale of stockpiled ivory, a significant increase in poaching was reported in Kenya's Tsavo and Damburu
wildlife reserves; recorded ivory seizures also increased 400% in

138. See Eddie Koch, The Great Pachyderm Debate, OutThere
(Jan.), at http://www.outthere.co.za/98/0129/displjan.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
139. See id.
140. Hereinafter "NGO's." Examples of these international organizations are Greenpeace, The World Wildlife Organization, The Fund
for Animals, and The International Fund for Animal Welfare.
141. See Sustainable Development International, African Nations
Sustain Ban on Ivory Trade, at http://www.sustdev.org/industry.
news/042000/0149.shtml (last visited Mar. 13, 2003). These same
groups also documented increased activity by elephant poachers and
ivory smugglers in Southeast Asia after the sale. Id.
142. Koch, supra note 138.
143. See id.
144. See Esmond Martin & Daniel Stiles, The Ivory Markets of Africa, at http://wildafrica.net/cites/messages/3.html (last visited Mar.
13, 2003).
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Kenya during 1999.145 Poachers in Kenya's Tsavo National Park
killed 29 elephants in 1999, five times the average annual total during the CITES Ivory Ban. 146 It is estimated that the price for ivory
rose from $22 before the 1999 sale to approximately $300 in the year
following the sale. 147 International NGO's reported the results of
studies showing that the demand for ivory stimulated by the "onetime" sale to Japan also led to increased poaching of elephants in
Southeast Asia. 148 One report credited the sale for the illegal killing
of over 6,000 elephants in Africa and Asia during 1998 and 1999.149
C. Reinstitution of the Ivory Ban
At the Convention of the Parties to CITES in Nairobi in 2000
(COP 11), Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Botswana proposed maintaining
the elephant on Appendix II in their nations and requested further
CITES-approved sales of stockpiled "legal" ivory.' 50 South Africa
joined the three nations in proposing future sales of stockpiled ivory,
with the proceeds of the sales to be used for elephant conservation

145. See id.; see also Farah Srockman, Tusks on Trial, Ivory Battle
Heats up in Nairobi, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR (Apr. 10,
2000), availableat http://abcnews.go.com/sections/science/Daily
News/Ivorytrade0000410.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003). (Where
the Kenyan Wildlife Service reported that 67 elephants were
poached in the year following the "Ivory Sale." In prior years, that
number was averaged at 15.) Id.
146. See Simon Robinson, Dyingfor Ivory, TIME EUROPE, Vol.155
No. 15,(Apr. 17, 2000), available at http://www.time.com/time/
europe/magazine/2000/0417/ivory.html (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
147. See Ivory Safaris, Only Elephants Should Wear Ivory: Arguments-Pros/Cons, at http://www.ivorynet.com/banivorytrade/arguments.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
148. See Stop the Clock Report 4 th April 2000: Executive Summary
at http://www.bornfree.org.uk/stoptheclock/poaching2.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
149. See id.
150. See Compromise on Ivory Ban Lift Reached, COSMIVERSE,
(Apr. 18, 2000), at http://www.cosmiverse.com/science041801.html
(last visited Mar. 13, 2003).
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programs in southern Africa.' 5' At the same time, Kenya and India,
fearful that further sales would lead to increased elephant poaching
(as occurred after the 1999 sale), proposed returning the African elephant to Appendix I in all52 Party nations, thereby resuming a total
global ban on ivory sales.'
A compromise was reached whereby the four southern African nations requesting further sales withdrew the proposal for two years
and Kenya and India in turn withdrew their proposal to return the
African elephant to Appendix I in all range states.' 53 As part of the
compromise, Parties agreed to delay any ivory sales until an effective system was in place to prevent the widespread poaching of elephants. 154 Pending scientific study of elephant population statistics
and the potential impacts of future limited ivory trade 155 the compromise agreement stayed any further discussion of additional ivory
sales until the next Convention of the Parties (COP 12) in November
2002.156

151. See id.; see also Srockman, supra note 145. South Africa
sought permission to sell a fifteen-year stockpile of ivory worth $12
million dollars. Id.
152. See Compromise On Ivory Ban Lift Reached, supra note 150.
153. Compromise Reached on Ivory Trade, BBC NEWS, (Apr. 17,
2000) at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/world/africa/newsid716000/716726.stm (last visited Mar. 13, 2003); see also HUNTER
ET AL., supra note 56, at 1018. The elephant remained on Appendix
II in Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Botswana, and was downlisted to Appendix II in South Africa. Id. However, the compromise agreement
included a zero quota of exports of ivory for the four nations for two
years, i.e. until the next COP. Id.
154. See Compromise Reached on Ivory Trade, supra note 153.
155. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 56, at 1018. The Parties attending COP 11 unanimously approved the creation of two monitoring systems for this purpose. They are the Monitoring Illegal Killing
of Elephants System (MIKE) and the Elephant Trade Information
System (ETIS). Id.
156. Santiago, Chile.
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VI. DISCUSSION

A. The Elephant at the Hands of Man: An Implied Legal Duty of
African Nations to Protect Elephants Under CITES
The Principle of Preservation states that environmental protection
is maximized when the individual or the state acts to initially prevent
harm rather than deal with the consequences of damage to the environment once it has occurred. 157 It has been stated that international
customary law includes the Principle of Preservation.' 58 Furthermore, one commentator has suggested that the Principle, as an element of international customary law, requires nations to adopt laws
and policies that work to preserve endangered species. 159 The Principle of Preservation is often associated with the Precautionary Principle since both concepts recognize the importance of taking preemptory steps to avoid environmental harm before it occurs.' The Precautionary Principle is invoked when action is taken to prevent harm
where the scientific understanding of a specific environmental threat
is incomplete.' 61
As stated in its Preamble,' 62 CITES acknowledges that all Parties
to the Convention share a legal duty to place the protection of endangered species above pure mercantile interests. In other words,
CITES prohibits a ratifying state from taking a position that risks the
ultimate survival of any endangered or threatened species within its
borders.
The legal duty to preserve endangered species under CITES reflects the belief that the unique flora and fauna of the Earth belong to
all inhabitants of the planet. The Common Concern of Mankind
Principle recognizes that the condition of the global environment is a
matter of concern for all humans.' 63 The Principle also views protec157. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 55, at 404.
158. See P. VAN HEHNSBERGEN, INTERNATIONAL LEGAL
PROTECTION OF WILD FAUNA AND FLORA 68 (1997).
159. See id. (citing Glennon, supra note 17, at 30).
160. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 55, at 405-06.
161. See id. at 406.
162. See CITES, supra note 50.
163. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 55, at 397. The Principle of
Common Concern forms the basis of all modern international environmental treaties. The Biodiversity and Climate Change Conven-
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tion of the environment as an area of law within both the jurisdiction
of a particular nation and that of the international community of nations, all acting in the best interests of mankind as a whole under
international law. 164
The debate over future ivory sales, therefore, takes place within the
bounds of a treaty (CITES) founded on the idea that unified global
regulation is required to save endangered species from exploitation
and eventual extinction. Cooperation and enforcement in this unified
approach is key to the future of CITES and of species listed in its
three Appendices. Proposals for future authorized sales of ivory, by
weakening protection of the elephant, in fact may weaken CITES's
ability to protect all endangered species.
B. CITES at the Crossroads
1. The Argument for New Sales: Sustainable Use of the Elephant
At the core of the CITES debate over future ivory sales is the longargued conflict between the strict preservationist view and the sustainable use view of environmental protection in Africa.' 65 Preservationists believe that African elephants are entitled to full protection;
being maintained in select ranges or preserves with their products
never entering the stream of domestic or international trade for any
reason. Furthermore, preservationists argue that elephants should be
protected using resources not connected with trade of the species, i.e.
elephants should not have to pay their way in their struggle to survive as a species.
Conservationists, on the other hand, argue that efforts to protect
elephants can, and should, be funded through trade in elephant products whenever possible. This is not to say that the sustainable use
conservationists do not recognize the need to protect the African elephant. Rather, the fundamental difference between the two theories
of protection of wildlife rests on the means and goals of protection.
The preservationist seeks full protection from a "top to bottom" approach, placing government and private funds at the disposal of
tions of 1992 were the first environmental treaties to expressly include the Principle in their rationale for action. Id.
164. See id.

165. See Edwards, supra note 94, at 128; see also HUNTER ET AL.,
supra note 55, at 1024.
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those entrusted to protect both species of African elephant. Sustainable use advocates also seek a substantial level of protection of the
elephant, but believe that the species itself, through trade of its products, should provide the funding for protection efforts. This "bottom
to top" approach embraces the strategy of having indigenous people
view the elephant as a resource to be protected for both its commercial value
to consumers, as well as for its inherent uniqueness as a
16 6
species.

Not all African states agree with Zimbabwe, Namibia, Botswana,
and South Africa (hereinafter "Southern States") that the only way to
save the elephant is through sustainable use. A great rift has occurred
between eastern and central African nations, such as Kenya, and
southern Africa, concerning the future of the elephant.' 67 Kenya, a
nation in which the African elephant nearly went extinct prior to the
Ivory Ban, prefers a continued total ban on any trade in elephant
products, fearing that any limited resumption of ivory trade will once
again lead to poaching on a massive scale. The Southern States,
however, claim that Kenya's loss of so many elephants prior to the
imposition of the 1989 ban resulted from its failure to stop poaching
within its borders.' 68 The Southern States argue that they have managed elephants more successfully than the eastern and central African states, both prior to and after the elephant was moved to Appendix I in 1989, and that they therefore should not be penalized by a
strict ban on the ivory trade. As one wildlife manager in Zimbabwe
put it:

Wildlife is a renewable resource. If utilized properly and
in a sustainable manner, it will go a long way towards
166. See Berger, supra note 42, at 454-55; see also Jose Roberto
Perez-Salom, Sustainable Tourism: Emerging Global and Regional
Regulation, 13 GEO. INT'L ENVTL. L. REV. 801, 806-7 (2001). Tourism related to wildlife and scenery can also serve as an important
method of sustainable use of resources by local communities. Id at
807.
167. See Berger, supra note 42, at 424.
168. See id. at 427.
169. See Nuftali Mungai, Zimbabwe Demands Legal Ivory Sales, at
http://www. save-the-elephants.org/Ele%20News%20Archive
%202001.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2003.) (quoting Brigadier E.W.
Kanhanga, Acting Director [retired], Zimbabwe Department of National Parks and Wildlife Management).
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improving our people's life as a country and a continent.
We want to make use of this resource which we have in
abundance. The fact that our elephant population is increasing should mean that we have put in place proper
and working protection systems. We believe this is something good ...
a plus,169which those opposed to our call
should reward us for.
In particular, the Southern States complain that effective elephant
management is expensive and that the sale of ivory, taken from culling and natural deaths of their burgeoning elephant populations, can
aid them in conserving the elephant for future generations in keeping
with the
Sustainable Development Principle of Intergenerational Eq170
uity.
Many Parties to CITES outside Africa disagree with the Southern
States' argument that sustainable use, i.e. a limited, authorized trade
in ivory, is the only way to save the elephant from extinction. For
example, India, a range state of the Asian elephant, fears that any
legalized trade in elephant parts will lead to the "dirty ivory" scenario in which approved ivory auctions include ivory taken by
poachers in Asia as well as Africa. 17 1 The United States and the
European Union also fear that approved ivory sales will lead to
widespread poaching that will once again push the elephant to extinction in many parts of its range. As Greenpeace spokesperson
Craig Culp put it, "We have been down this road 1before.
The minute
72
you remove the outright ban, all control is gone."'
The Southern States view these objections to their plans for sustainable use of the elephant as interference with their right, as sovereign nations, to use their natural resources as they see fit. 173 The
Southern States challenge these objections as inappropriate meddling
by Western states and international NGO's in their internal policies

170. See HUNTER ET AL., supra note 55, at 398-99. One goal of
sustainable development is conservation of natural resources for future generations. Id.
171. See Berger, supra note 42, at 431.
172. Srockman, supra note 145.
173. See Berger, supra note 42,at 418.
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and suggest that such attempted controls on their export of ivory
amount to neo-imperialism. 17
2. The Argument Against New Sales: Let Sleeping Giants Lie
Ironically, both African and non-African Parties supporting a permanent ban on ivory sales find their most persuasive support for the
ban in CITES's sensitivity towards the sovereignty, internal legislative processes, and police powers of African member states. They
argue that, since the international community at large supported the
1989 Ban, any resumption of ivory trade - no matter how small weakens that commitment and threatens the ultimate survival of the
elephant. The 1997 decision to allow Zimbabwe, Namibia, and Botswana to sell stockpiled ivory to Japan has been described by one
NGO as "the biggest conservation blunder of the 1990,s.,,175 Referring to the mixed message the 1999 "one-time" sale sent to Africans
and the rest of the world, the U.S. based NGO Fund for Animals
stated:
It is sad that thousands of elephants had to die over the
last three years to highlight the negative effects of the
174. See Thaddeus McBride, The Dangers of Liberal NeoColonialism: Elephants, Ivory and the CITES Treaty: The Dilemmas
of Africanization: Choices and Dangersfor Sub-SaharanAfrica 19
B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 733, 744 (1999). The reviewer suggests that
the elephant was moved to Appendix I in 1989 over the objection of
the Southern States without due regard for their sovereignty because
Western nations easily met the two-thirds majority required for such
action. He states that the elephant controversy "serves as a strong
reminder that Africa is not far removed from the imperial era." Id. at
734. However, his argument that the actions of CITES to fully protect the elephant evokes images of the neo-colonial period in Africa
fails to explain why other African states, also once ruled by Europeans, supported the initial 1989 Ivory Ban. Furthermore, it fails to
explain why these same eastern and central African states want no
future sales of ivory.
175. Margot Higgins, Elephants Face Killing Fields Again, ENN,
Jan. 24, 2000, at http://www.enn.com/enn-news-archive/2000/01/
01242000/ivoryanniv93 14.asp (last visited Mar. 4, 2003) (quoting
Allan Thornton, chairman of Britain's Environmental Investigation
Agency).
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1997 CITES decision. The greed of poachers knows no
bounds and any ivory trade sanctioned by CITES parties
would only cause more elephant carcasses to pile up and
more wildlife department budgets to be exhausted.
The 1997 decision to allow the "one-time" sale of stockpiled ivory
to Japan by the Southern States infuriated environmental activists
around the world who feared the sale would "blow the lid off the
global ban" by stimulating consumer demand for ivory. 177 Many
believed that once the "sleeping giant of demand" for ivory was
awakened by the CITES-authorized sale, the Convention would be
unsuccessful in 78any future attempts to protect the African elephant
from poachers. 1
The 1999 sale places CITES at a crossroads: a retreat from the total Ivory Ban raises familiar questions about the Convention's ability
to protect endangered species in the future. In particular, the sale
reignited the debate as to whether CITES can ever be ultimately effective in protecting endangered species because it defers to, and
relies heavily upon, the Principles of Sovereignty and Subsidiarity.
a. The Sovereignty Principle
CITES has been criticized as the quintessential example of how the
Principle of Sovereignty generally weakens global environmental
treaties. 79 In particular, the Convention's monitoring and enforcement provisions have been labeled as ineffective in that Parties, on
one hand, voluntarily agree to submit to the treaty, but on the other
hand, may take reservations at will.18 Furthermore, when a Party
176. See Sustainable Development International, supra note 141
(quoting Christine Wolf, Director of Gov't and Int'l Affairs for Fund
for Animals).
177. Id.
178. Berger, supra note 42, at 419 n.3 (quoting lain DouglasHamilton, An East African Perspective) "We are convinced in conservation circles in East Africa that the CITES decision of 1997 to
allow limited trade risks a resumption of the uncontrolled illegal
trading of then past. Tinkering with limited sales will lend legitimacy to the purchasing of ivory and might well wake up a sleeping
giant of demand." Id.
179. See SUSSKIND, supra note 93, at 102.
180. See id.
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violates an applicable provision of the Convention, CITES provides
81
no sanctions or mechanisms to enforce compliance.'
The moving of the elephant to Appendix I in 1989 demonstrated
how the treaty could then overcome the defense of national sovereignty so as to protect an endangered species. The massive scale of
the slaughter of African elephants by poachers for their tusks had
pushed the species to the brink of extinction within many parts of
their respective ranges. The Parties to CITES found it necessary to
act and, in doing so, informed African nations that they could no
longer allow the demand for ivory to destroy an endangered species.
The decision to move the African elephant to Appendix I in the face
of strong opposition by southern African states transcended notions
of national sovereignty. While it is true that these African states
could take a reservation to the transfer of the elephant to Appendix I,
that listing in fact stopped them from legally placing elephant products into the stream of international trade since an import permit as
well as an export permit are required for Appendix I species. Import
permits would not be forthcoming from an overwhelming majority
of Parties to CITES, both in the West and Asia. The effect of the
Appendix I listing was obvious and dramatic; demand for ivory disappeared, prices sank, and the massive poaching of elephants
stopped.
At the Convention of the Parties to CITES (COP 12) held in Santiago, Chile, in November 2002, Zimbabwe, Namibia, Botswana and
South Africa sought authorization for annual sales quotas of elephant
ivory. 182 Although the Convention denied the request for quotas,
Namibia, Botswana and South Africa received permission to conduct
another one-time sale of stockpiled ivory.' 83 If these new authorized
sales are a response to the argument that nations have the right to
manage the elephant as a natural resource with resale value, the
Convention faces an unraveling of its power to ultimately protect the
elephant and other marketable endangered or threatened species. A
181. See id.
182. AFRICAN ELEPHANT CONSERVATION, Report on CITES Meeting, Santiago, Chile, at http://www.panda.org/resources/publications/species/cites/fs-afeleph.html (last visited May 12, 2003).
183. Melissa Groo, ELEPHANT INFORMATION REPOSITORY, CITES
2002 Report, at http://elephant.elehost.com/News/CurrentSitu(last visited
ations/CTES_2002_Report/cites_2002_report.html
May 21, 2003).
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handful of nations selling ivory, rushing to use the elephant as a
"quick fix" for failed economies, risks causing a dramatic increase in
poaching of elephants in both Africa and Asia. If CITES allows the
poaching of elephants to increase significantly, CITES may seriously
damage its authority to regulate trade in endangered species in the
face of future claims of interference with national sovereignty. The
firm resolve to protect the elephant - and derivatively, all endangered species - demonstrated in the 1989 resolution to move the elephant to full protection under Appendix I evaporates with each additional sale of ivory authorized by CITES.
b. The SubsidiarityPrinciple
CITES does not contain any provisions for enforcing a ratifying
nation's obligations under the Convention. Instead, the treaty relies
on each Party to enact and enforce national legislation that conforms
its domestic endangered species protection and trade laws to the provision of CITES. By relying on national governments to carry out
its provisions, CITES invokes the Principle of Subsidiarity. Under
this Principle there is a preference that decision-making take place at
the lowest level of government at which an issue or policy can be
effectively managed. 18 4 Under CITES, Parties are required to enact
domestic laws that protect endangered flora and fauna by the interdiction of illegal shipments and prosecution and punishment of
poachers and other illegal traffickers of wildlife.
CITES's reliance on domestic legislative and police powers to enforce the provisions of the Convention defers to the sovereign rights
of a Party to govern its citizens and regulate the use and protection
of its natural resources. However, particularly in Africa, CITES's
deference to local government action is overly optimistic.
Protection of endangered species under CITES requires stable
governments with adequate financial resources to implement its provisions. During the past decade, the world has watched as many African nations suffered chronic political instability as a result of civil

184. HUNTER ET. AL, supra note 55, at 416.
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of devastatwars, 185 mass genocide,' 86 famine, 18 an AIDS epidemic
89
outbreaks.'
Ebola
sporadic
and
ing proportions,188
185. See Anup Shah, Conflicts in Africa (Oct. 4, 2001), at
http://www.globalissues.org/Geopolitics/Africa. asp (last visited Mar.
4, 2003). Recently, civil wars raged in a multitude of African nations
including Angola, Algeria, Burundi, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Liberia,
Nigeria, Congo, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Uganda, Angola and Congo.
Some 9.5 million refugees were displaced by war in Africa. Id.; see
also generally Human Rights Watch: Africa, at ttp://www.hrw.org/
africa/index.php (last visited Mar. 4, 2003). Currently, civil war
rages in Sudan, Angola, Uganda, and Congo. The Sudanese civil war
has continued unabated for nineteen years. Id.
186. See Rwandans Relive Horror of Genocide, The Washington
Post, at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A111492002Mar24.html. A half-million Tutis and Hutus were killed in ethnic genocide during a 100 day period of the 1994 Rwandan civil
war. Id.; see also Eyewitness: UN in Rwanda 1994, The Washington
Post, Sept. 6, 2000, at http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/
world/africa/newsid_911000/911232.stm (last visited Mar. 4, 2003).
Some estimates of the Tutsi and Hutu death toll reach 800,000. Id.
187. See Famine in Africa: 2.6 Million Go Hungry (Mar. 28, 2002)
at http://archive.mg.co.za/NXT/gateway.dll?f=templates&fn=default.
htm$vid=MailGuard:MailGuardView&npusemame=clot&nppasswo
rd=clot (last visited Mar. 4, 2003). The UN World Food Program,
seeking 69 million dollars in aid, estimates that 2.6 million Africans
are starving in the half of the continent. WFP also warns the food
crisis is worsening. Id.
188. See John Christensen, AIDS in Africa: Dying by the Numbers
at http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/2000/aids/stories/overview/ (last
visited Mar. 4, 2003). Of the 34.3 million people worldwide infected
with AIDS in 1999, 24.5 million lived in sub-Saharan Africa. Id. By
1999, the death toll due to AIDS in Africa stood at 19 million, of
which 3.8 million were children under 15 years of age. Id. The bubonic plague, at it peak in medieval Europe, killed 30 million. Id.
The U.S. Census Bureau projects AIDS deaths and loss of population due to premature death of women of child-bearing age will reduce the population growth of Africa by 71 million by 2010. Id.
AIDS will reduce the life expectancy in sub-Saharan Africa from 59
to 45 years of age between 2005 and 2010. Id. In Zimbabwe, the life
expectancy will drop from 61 to 33 due to AIDS during that same
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The current bushmeat crisis is the direct result of chaos in many
parts of Africa. If the native people of Africa find it necessary to
slaughter native fauna, endangered or not, for mere subsistence purposes, how likely is it that African states will have, or use, the necessary resources to protect the elephant? Although the CITES Conference of Parties may condition future authorized ivory sales on using
the proceeds for elephant conservation efforts, how likely is it that
these funds will be used for that purpose? The fact remains that the
"one time" ivory sale in 1999 renewed interest in ivory as a commodity and led to increased poaching of elephants, both in Africa
and Asia. Waking this sleeping giant of demand, and then relying on
African nations to control poaching in the present political and economic atmosphere on the continent, is a recipe for disaster for the
elephant.
VII. CONCLUSION

CITES is the embodiment of international environmental law regulating trade in endangered and threatened species. However, the
Convention also represents the frontline in the war to protect the
flora and fauna of the Earth from extinction due to non-sustainable
use and exploitation by man. Founded on the Principles of Preservation, Precaution, and the Common Concern of Mankind, the treaty
places a legal duty on nations to protect species found within their
borders from utilization incompatible with the survival of the species.
The 1989 Ivory Ban stands as a model for international action to
save an endangered species facing extinction within a decade or two.
The Ivory Ban allowed the Convention to avoid claims of direct interference in African national affairs and effectively stopped the
time period. Id. The World Bank reported to the U.N. Security
Council in January 2000 that an effective and comprehensive AIDS
prevention program for sub-Saharan Africa would cost $2.3 billion a
year. Id. It is estimated that the per capita income in most subSaharan countries has declined by 20% due to the AIDS crisis. Id.
189. See Disease Information: Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever, Jan. 18,

2001, http://www.hc-sc.gc.ca/pphb-dgspsp/tmp-pmv/info/ebolae.
html (last visited Mar. 4, 2003). Since 1994, Ebola outbreaks occurred in the Democratic Republic of Congo, Ivory Coast, Gabon,
South Africa, and Uganda. Id.
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massive poaching of elephants in Africa by united action that destroyed the market for illegal trade in ivory. The 1989 Ivory Ban also
represented a method by which the international community could
enforce CITES's protection of the elephant. This protection occurred
through united action to dry up the market for illegal elephant products, rather than reliance on the domestic legislation and law enforcement efforts of African nations.
In short, the 1989 Ivory Ban represented the best of CITES. In imposing the Ban, the Parties refused to allow theories of national sovereignty and subsidiarity to prevent unified action in order to save
the elephant from extinction by poachers before the arrival of the
new millennium. Southern African states, however, reject this view
of the 1989 Ivory Ban and regard it as an unjustified interference in
their internal affairs. They demand that the Convention authorize
new sales in exchange for their commitment to support CITES's protection for elephants. However, if the critics of the authorized 1999
sale of ivory to Japan are correct, new ivory sales will weaken global
efforts to save the elephant by waking the sleeping giant of demand
for ivory.
As a growing list of African states agitate for future authorized
sales of ivory, the world fears that the pressure from southern range
states will eventually lead the CITES Convention of Parties to
downlist the elephant to Appendix II throughout Africa. As the Convention wrestles with each new proposal for authorized ivory sales,
the question must be asked whether the decision reached by the Parties at COP 12 in November 2002 determined not only the future
survival of the elephant in Africa and Asia, but of the ultimate future
effectiveness of CITES as well. Many environmentalists believe approval of future ivory sales will ultimately lead to a world devoid of
the unique and wonderful animal we call the elephant. If the Convention of Parties continues in this direction, CITES may render a
blow against endangered species that ultimately will lead to the
Convention's own extinction.

